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OSBORNE V. NEBLETT AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS:
DOES THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE LAW INCLUDE
THE POWER TO DECLARE THAT RIGHTS UNDER THE
LAW CANNOT BE WAIVED?
Michael J. Bentley*
I. INTRODUCTION
A first principle of Mississippi law is that the three branches of govern-
ment are separate and equal in their constitutional spheres. The legislature
makes the law, the executive enforces the law, and the judiciary applies the
law in cases and controversies. Each branch has core powers, necessary to
fulfill its constitutional duties, that the others may not encroach upon.
Among the core powers of the judiciary is the power to set procedures for
the efficient resolution of cases. Legislative enactments that conflict with
those procedures are unconstitutional.
The Mississippi Court of Appeals' decision in Osborne v. Neblett, how-
ever, calls this principle into doubt.1 In Osborne, a divided court held that
the judicial waiver doctrine does not apply to claims that a foreclosure sale
was void due to a violation of the publication requirements in Mississippi
Code section 89-1-55. If Osborne was correctly decided, the court of ap-
peals has identified an exception to the rule against legislative interference
with judicial procedure-the legislative power to declare certain acts null
and void as a matter of substantive law includes the power to prevent a
court from applying the judicial waiver doctrine to a litigant's claim for
relief from the void act.
In this Article, I argue that Osborne was not correctly decided. The
power to say when a litigant has waived an argument or claim-even a
meritorious one-is a judicial power reserved to the courts; it may not be
exercised or limited by the legislature. The court of appeals construed sec-
tion 89-1-55 in an unconstitutional manner even though this construction
was not mandated by the statutory language and should have been
avoided. If permitted to stand, Osborne's anti-waiver rule would preclude
the application of the waiver doctrine in both the trial and appellate courts,
and even prevent a court from declaring a dispute res judicata, so long as
one of the litigants can invoke a statute that declares something to be a
legal nullity. Given its potential to disrupt the orderly and efficient disposi-
tion of judicial business, I suggest that Osborne should be overruled when
the opportunity is presented.
* Michael J. Bentley is an associate in the Jackson Office of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
LLP, where his practice focuses on commercial litigation and appeals.
1. 65 So. 3d 311 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
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II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE "CORE POWERS" DOCTRINE
Mississippi's 1890 Constitution establishes three branches of govern-
ment and forbids encroachment by any one upon the powers of the other:
The powers of the government of the state of Mississippi
shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of
them confided to a separate magistracy, to-wit: those which
are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another,
and those which are executive to another.2
No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging
to one of these departments, shall exercise any power prop-
erly belonging to either of the others.3
Earlier versions of the state constitution, including the original one,
adopted in 1817, contained similar separation-of-powers provisions.4
For many years after the adoption of the 1890 Constitution, the judici-
ary was content to follow legislatively-enacted procedural and evidentiary
rules.5 But in 1975, in Newell v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court as-
serted broad authority over court procedure, striking down a statute that
prohibited a trial judge from instructing the jury on his own initiative.6 The
Newell court declared that there was "no room for a division of authority
between the judiciary and the legislature as to the power to promulgate
rules necessary to accomplish the judiciary's constitutional purpose." 7 That
power belonged to the judiciary alone.8 While Newell's broad assertion of
judicial power had its detractors initially,9 it is now settled law that "[a]ny
legislation that hampers judicial action or interferes with the discharge of
judicial functions is unconstitutional."10
To guide judges and, no doubt, legislators as to the proper application
of the separation-of-powers principle, the Mississippi Supreme Court de-
veloped the "core powers" doctrine: no branch of state government may
exercise any of the "core powers" belonging to the other two." The core
2. Miss. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. id. §2.
4. Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss. 1983). Judge Leslie H.
Southwick provides an excellent and exhaustive analysis of the separation of powers doctrine under the
Mississippi Constitution in his two-part article for the Mississippi Law Journal. See Leslie H.
Southwick, Separation of Powers at the State Level: Interpretations and Challenges in Mississippi, 72
Miss. L.J. 927 (2003); Leslie H. Southwick, Separation of Powers at the State Level, Part II: Service in
Civilian Public Office and in the National Guard, 74 Miss. L.J. 47 (2004).
5. See Lenore L. Prather, A Century of Judicial History, 69 Miss. L.J. 1013, 1043-44 (2000); Hall
v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1351-52 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
6. Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 75-78 (Miss. 1975); see Justin L. Matheny, Inherent Judicial
Rule Making Authority and the Right to Appeal: Time for Clarification, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 57, 57-60
(2002).
7. 308 So. 2d at 77.
8. Id. at 77-78.
9. See Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1349-66 (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
10. Jones v. City of Ridgeland, 48 So. 3d 530, 536 (Miss. 2010).
11. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 343 (Miss. 1987); Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain,
441 So. 2d 1329, 1338, 1345-46 (Miss. 1983).
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power of the executive is "the power to administer and enforce the laws as
enacted by the legislature and as interpreted by the courts."' 2 The "legisla-
tive power . . . is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce
them .4.. ."'s Those laws represent policy choices that, presumably, reflect
the will of the people and serve the public interest.' 4 The legislative policy-
making power includes the authority to impose preconditions for filing a
lawsuit.'5  But that authority yields to the supreme court's rule-making
power "when the suit is filed."' 6 Substantive laws enacted by the legisla-
ture must be enforced by the courts, so long as they are constitutional, even
if they are impractical, unwise, or unfair.'
Once a suit is filed, the judicial power controls and that power "ha[s]
been broadly declared" by the constitution.' 8 In general terms, " 'the judi-
cial power' . . . includes the power to make rules of practice and procedure,
not inconsistent with the Constitution, for the efficient disposition of judi-
cial business."19 The court has identified a number of specific powers
within the judiciary's general power to conduct "judicial business," includ-
ing the powers to promulgate rules of civil and appellate procedure,2 0 es-
tablish rules of evidence, 2 ' develop and apply common law,22 and
determine whether a case or controversy has been abated.2 3 These authori-
ties fall within the "core powers" of the judiciary because they require the
exercise of "judicial discretion [and] judgment that is vested in the
courts." 2 4 The legislature may not take away or interfere with any of these
core judicial powers.2 5
The supreme court has recognized one exception to the judiciary's ab-
solute authority over matters of court procedure. In Claypool v. Mladineo,
the court affirmed a statute that precluded the records of a medical peer
review committee from being discovered or introduced as evidence in a
judicial proceeding. 26 The statute declared that it would control the use of
12. Alexander, 441 So. 2d at 1338.
13. Id.
14. See Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883, 889 (Miss. 1994).
15. Thomas v. Warden, 999 So. 2d 842, 846-47 (Miss. 2008).
16. Id. at 847 ("The Legislature's authority to make law gives way to this Court's rule-making
authority when the suit is filed, not before."). The supreme court has identified one exception to this
general rule. See Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1998) (affirming legislative enactment
controlling the introduction of medical peer review evidence in court proceedings). That exception is
discussed later in this Article.
17. Thomas, 999 So. 2d at 846; Wells, 645 So. 2d at 889.
18. Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1345 (Miss. 1989).
19. Southern Pac. Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So. 2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968) (citing Miss. CONsT.
art. VI, § 144).
20. Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76-78 (Miss. 1975) (rules of civil procedure); Jones v. City of
Ridgeland, 48 So. 3d 530, 535-38 (Miss. 2010) (rules of appellate procedure).
21. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1345-46; but see Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 377-81.
22. Presley v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288, 1294-96 (Miss. 1992).
23. Miller v. Hay, 109 So. 16, 17 (Miss. 1926).
24. Jones, 48 So. 3d at 537.
25. Presley, 608 So. 2d at 1294-95; see Jones, 48 So. 3d at 537.
26. 724 So. 2d 373, 377-81 (Miss. 1998) (discussing Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 & § 41-63-23
(Supp. 1997)).
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such peer review evidence "[n]otwithstanding any conflicting . . . court
rule." 2 7 Departing from its general rule, the supreme court held that "[t]he
[l]egislature was within its constitutional authority when it enacted" this
evidentiary statute. 2 8 The court reasoned that the public had a significant
interest in quality health care and the legislature had the authority, under
its police power, to promote self-policing of the health care industry in or-
der to serve that public interest. 9 In this narrow instance, the evidentiary
statutes preventing the discovery and use of peer review records "were nec-
essary additions to the substantive law" and, therefore, constitutional. 3 0
Although no published opinion has addressed the point, determining
when a legal claim has been lost pursuant to the doctrines of waiver and res
judicata falls within the core judicial power. The "waiver doctrine" pre-
vents a party from recovering on claims that were not adequately pled or
presented to the trial court prior to the entry of a final judgment.31 The
doctrine of res judicata prevents the subsequent litigation of claims that
were actually litigated and that could have been litigated in a previous
suit.32 Both of these procedural doctrines are judicial creations and both
are fundamental to the orderly and efficient disposition of cases before the
court.33
If the legislature enacted a statute barring the application of the
waiver and res judicata doctrines in certain cases, the statute would surely
be declared unconstitutional because it would directly abridge a court's
power to manage judicial proceedings. Unlike the narrow evidentiary stat-
ute that was approved in Claypool, which simply limited the type of evi-
dence that a party could bring into court to support its claims, an "anti-
waiver" or "anti-res judicata" statute would seriously disrupt the orderly
progression of litigation. Litigants would be permitted to raise claims and
arguments for the first time in post-trial motions, on appeal, or even in a
subsequent lawsuit after the first suit has been completed. Because of the
disruptive effect that such a rule could have on court proceedings, the judi-
ciary has traditionally controlled how and when a litigant must present his
arguments or risk losing them.
27. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (2011).
28. Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 381.
29. Id. at 380-81.
30. Id. at 381.
31. Brown v. Miss. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 29 So. 3d 766, 771-73 (Miss. 2010); Touart v. Johnston,
656 So. 2d 318, 321 (Miss. 1995); see LUTHER T. MUNFORD, MIssIssiPPi APPELLATE PRACTICE
§§ 3.1-3.7 (MLI Press 2006).
32. Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1084-85 (Miss. 2009); see JEFFREY JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.1 (Lawyers Coop. Publ'g 1996).
33. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc., 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (Miss. 2005) (noting that "[rjes
judicata is fundamental to the equitable and efficient operation of the judiciary"); City of Jackson v.
McAllister, 475 So. 2d 432, 433 (Miss. 1985) ("The doctrine of res judicata is a judicial creation and does
not apply to legislative acts."); Meadows v. Blake, 36 So. 3d 1225, 1233-34 (Miss. 2010) (Waller, C.J.,
concurring) (explaining the rationale for deerning an argument waived); United States v. Vontsteen, 950
F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing origin and purposes of waiver doctrine).
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III. OSBORNE V. NEBLETT DEPARTS FROM THE CORE
POWERS DOCTRINE
Osborne arrived at the court of appeals as a routine waiver case, or so
it appeared. Perry Osborne executed a promissory note to G. Rives
Neblett for the purchase of land in Alligator, Mississippi. 4 To secure pay-
ment, Osborne granted Neblett a deed of trust on the land.35 Osborne
later defaulted and Neblett began the foreclosure process.3 6 On the day of
the foreclosure sale, Osborne sued in chancery court to enjoin the
foreclosure. 3 7
Osborne, proceeding pro se, asserted numerous reasons why the fore-
closure should be enjoined and generally questioned Neblett's right to
foreclose against the property.3 8 Importantly, Osborne did not allege that
Neblett had violated the publication requirements of Mississippi Code sec-
tion 89-1-55, which requires all foreclosure sales to be advertised for three
consecutive weeks prior to the sale. 3 9  The statute requires strict compli-
ance, declaring that "[n]o sale of lands under a deed of trust or mortgage,
shall be valid unless such sale shall have been advertised as herein provided
for." 4 0  After a hearing, the chancellor found against Osborne in all re-
spects, confirmed the foreclosure sale, and ordered Osborne to vacate the
property. 41 The chancellor did not address the publication issue because
Osborne did not raise it.42 Osborne did not appeal the decision.4 3
After the time for an appeal had expired, an attorney appeared for
Osborne in the chancery court and filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the




38. Id.; see id. at 314 (Griffis, P.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 312-13 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (2011)). Section 89-1-55 provides as follows:
All lands comprising a single tract, and wholly described by the subdivisions of the govern-
mental surveys, sold under mortgages and deeds of trust, shall be sold in the manner provided
by section one hundred eleven of the constitution for the sale of lands in pursuance of a decree
of court, or under execution. All lands sold at public outcry under deeds of trust or other
contracts shall be sold in the county in which the land is located, or in the county of the
residence of the grantor, or one of the grantors in the trust deed, provided that where the land
is situated in two or more counties, the parties may contract for a sale of the whole in any of
the counties in which any part of the land lies. Sale of said lands shall be advertised for three
consecutive weeks preceding such sale, in a newspaper published in the county, or, if none is so
published, in some paper having a general circulation therein, and by posting one notice at the
courthouse of the county where the land is situated, for said time, and such notice and adver-
tisement shall disclose the name of the original mortgagor or mortgagors in said deed of trust
or other contract. No sale of lands under a deed of trust or mortgage, shall be valid unless such
sale shall have been advertised as herein provided for, regardless of any contract to the contrary.
An error in the mode of sale such as makes the sale void will not be cured by any statute of
limitations, except as to the ten-year statute of adverse possession.
§ 89-1-55 (emphasis added).
40. Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (2011).
41. Osborne, 65 So. 3d at 312. The chancellor's written order is set forth in its entirety in the
dissenting opinion. Id. at 316 17 (Griffis, P.1., dissenting).
42. See id. at 318 (Griffis, P.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 312.
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Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure for relief from the judgment confirm-
ing the foreclosure sale.44 Osborne's attorney raised the deficient publica-
tion argument for the first time in this post-trial motion.4 5 The chancellor
denied the motion, holding that Osborne had waived the deficient publica-
tion argument by failing to raise it in his complaint, during proceedings in
the chancery court, or at any other point prior to the entry of final judg-
ment.4 6 Osborne appealed.
Osborne's appeal was assigned to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, 4 7
where Osborne again found himself without an attorney. 48 Osborne's brief
argued the merits-the foreclosure sale was invalid, an absolute nullity, be-
cause Neblett had not advertised the sale for three consecutive weeks, as
required by section 89-1-55; Osborne ignored the waiver issue.49 Neblett's
brief argued only the procedural point-Osborne's deficient publication ar-
gument had been waived and could not be addressed by the court of ap-
peals; Neblett ignored the merits.5 0 Confronted with these divergent
arguments, the judges of the court of appeals split.
A. The Majority Declares the Waiver Doctrine "Irrelevant"
to Claims that a Foreclosure Sale Was Void
Writing for a majority of five judges, Judge Tyree Irving reversed the
chancery court's decision and declared the foreclosure sale invalid." On
the merits, the majority held that the foreclosure sale of Osborne's prop-
erty was void because Neblett did not comply with the publication require-
ments of section 89-1-55.5 Turning to Neblett's waiver argument, the
majority held that Osborne could not waive his deficient publication argu-
ment under the statute: "[A]s the statute clearly states, foreclosure sales
that do not comply with section 89-1-55 are void, and Osborne's failure to
raise the issue is irrelevant because the sale is a nullity and unenforceable
under the law."5 The majority also cited Mississippi Supreme Court pre-
cedent holding that the publication requirements of a foreclosure sale may
not be waived by parties to the deed of trust.5 4
44. Id.; see id. at 314-18 (Griffis, P.J., dissenting) (recounting the procedural history of the case
in detail). Rule 60(b) provides that a "court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding" for certain, enumerated reasons. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
45. Osborne, 65 So. 3d at 312.
46. Id.
47. Under Mississippi's appeal procedure, all appeals are taken to the supreme court. The su-
preme court assigns cases to the court of appeals as appropriate. See Miss. R. App. P. 16.
48. See generally, Brief of Appellant, Osborne v. Neblett, No. 2009-CP-01312 (Miss. Ct. App.
June 7, 2011).
49. Id.
50. See generally, Brief of Appellee, Osborne v. Neblett, No. 2009-CP-01312 (Miss. Ct App. June
7, 2011).
51. Osborne, 65 So. 3d at 313. There are ten judges on the Mississippi Court of Appeals and the
court took Osborne's appeal en banc. In this case, however, five judges constituted a majority because
newly-appointed Judge Ermea Russell did not participate in the decision. Id.
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id. (citing Lee v. Magnolia Bank, 48 So. 2d 515, 517 (Miss. 1950)).
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B. The Dissent Argues that Osborne Waived his Valid Argument
Four judges dissented. In an opinion by Judge T. Kenneth Griffis, the
dissenters argued that the majority had "confused the possibility of a void
foreclosure with a void judgment."" According to the dissent, the proper
question on appeal was not whether the foreclosure sale was valid or inva-
lid as a matter of substantive law, but whether the chancellor erred, as a
procedural matter, by holding that Osborne had waived his deficient publi-
cation argument. The answer to that question, according to the dissent,
was no; the chancellor properly held that Osborne had waived his deficient
publication argument by failing to raise it in his complaint or at any point
prior to the entry of a final judgment on all of his claims. The dissent
cited the settled rule "that issues may not be raised in a post-trial motion if
the issue should have been made during the trial but was not.""
Despite Judge Griffis's strong dissent, Neblett did not seek a writ of
certiorari from the supreme court.5 Perhaps this was because, as the ma-
jority noted, Neblett had a less costly route for enforcing his security agree-
ment-he could simply re-notice the foreclosure sale if Osborne was still in
default under the loan agreement.6 0 But Neblett's decision not to pursue a
discretionary appeal could prove costly to future litigants, who will be left
in the unenviable position of not knowing whether their final judgments
are really final. The controversy between Neblett and Osborne is over, but
the rule in Osborne lingers.
IV. OSBORNE's DISRUPTIVE ANTI-WAIVER RULE Is NOT MANDATED
By THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 89-1-55
"Both public policy and the interests of litigants require that there
must be an end to litigation. Without this doctrine, it would be endless." 6 1
The Osborne decision threatens to disrupt this doctrine-and undermine
the interest of litigants in the orderly and final adjudication of their
claims-because it abrogates the rules of waiver and res judicata in cases
where a statute declares an act or right to be null and void. Not only does
Osborne present serious practical problems, it represents a significant (if
silent) doctrinal break from the supreme court's separation of powers juris-
prudence-when confronted with a conflict between a statute and a proce-
dural rule, Osborne followed the statute and disregarded the rule.
Osborne was a "hard case": a pro se litigant arrived in court with a
valid legal basis to set aside the foreclosure sale of his property, but failed
to present that valid argument and, therefore, lost his property on what
55. Id. (Griffis, P.J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 319.
58. Id. (citing Barnett v. State, 725 So. 2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1Q98)).
59. See Miss. R. APP. P. 17 (authorizing discretionary appeals from the Mississippi Court of
Appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court).
60. Osborne, 65 So. 3d at 313 (majority op.).
61. Moses v. weaver, 49 So. 2d 235, 238 (Miss. 1950).
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non-lawyers would call a "technicality" (the waiver doctrine). On appeal,
the briefs did not assist the court-one argued the merits, the other argued
the procedural waiver point, and neither raised the practical and constitu-
tional implications of a reversal in favor of Osborne. Unfortunately, this
hard case proved the old adage.6 2 This Article is not intended to be a ret-
rospective criticism of the court of appeals or the judges that serve on that
court; I raise no objections to the result in Osborne. This Article is pro-
spective-it addresses the procedural route by which the result in Osborne
was reached and identifies (what the author believes are) problems that
Osborne's procedural holding will create for future litigants. In our system
of stare decisis, these problems may not be ignored.
A. The Osborne Rule Will Disrupt Court Proceedings and
Undermine the Finality of Judgments Principle
Osborne gives rise to two practical problems. First, although Osborne
(in fact) applied its anti-waiver to a trial court waiver, its rule (in theory)
extends to all "waiver" doctrines, including the appellate waiver doctrine
and res judicata. Under Osborne, a litigant may not waive an argument
that the foreclosure against his property was invalid due to a violation of
section 89-1-55. Such an argument must be considered by the trial court
even if it is raised for the first time in a post-trial motion. Of course, if the
argument may be raised for the first time post-trial, there is no principled
reason to say that it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or even in
a subsequent lawsuit after the initial controversy has been fully adjudi-
cated. And nothing in the language of Osborne limits its rule to "trial
court" waivers. If the waiver doctrine is truly "irrelevant" when a statute
declares an act null and void, as Osborne held,63 then it is irrelevant at
every stage of the judicial proceeding.
The practical problems created by such an anti-waiver rule are signifi-
cant. A party may proceed all the way through discovery and trial on one
claim or theory and then, after a judgment is entered, switch theories com-
pletely if he discovers an applicable statute declaring a relevant act null and
void. Because the argument cannot be deemed waived, the parties will be
forced to return to square one, re-open discovery and, if necessary, retry
the case on the new claim or theory. And this may happen on appeal as
well. If the argument is presented for the first time on appeal, the appellate
court, without the power to deem the argument waived, may be forced to
remand the case to the trial court for further fact-finding on the new claim
or argument.
62. "It is an old adage in legal circles that hard cases make bad law." Nat'l Surety Co. v. Miller,
124 So. 251, 257 (Miss. 1929) (Ethiridge, J., dissenting). The adage cautions against adopting a legal
principle that will bind all future litigants in an attempt to reach a favorable result for a sympathetic
party in the particular case before the court. See id.; see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. 65 So. 3d at 313.
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Perhaps most problematic of all is Osborne's potential to cast uncer-
tainty over disputes that have already been adjudicated and judgments that
are presumed to be final. As noted, if the waiver doctrine does not apply
under a statute that declares a certain act null and void, then the doctrine
of res judicata likely does not apply either. After all, the doctrine's
"merger" component is simply a super-waiver doctrine.t Under Osborne,
however, a claim that a certain act was a nullity cannot be barred unless it
was actually litigated and resolved by a court; until that time, the claim
remains extant no matter how many times the parties have litigated other
claims. When the anti-waiver rule is carried to its logical ends, even parties
whose property was long ago foreclosed upon may file a suit today chal-
lenging the foreclosure sale as invalid based on deficient publication (if
they did not raise that argument in a previous suit). These suits could upset
not only final judgments on the original foreclosure, but subsequent con-
veyances of the foreclosed property as well. Such suits may also subject the
foreclosing party to liability for damages under a wrongful foreclosure the-
ory.65 Osborne's rule holds the potential to seriously disrupt the finality of
judgments in land transactions, an area in which certainty and finality are
critical.
The second practical problem under Osborne is that its anti-waiver
rule arguably extends beyond the foreclosure sale context to any case in
which a statute declares a certain act or right to be invalid, null, or void. If
the waiver doctrine is "irrelevant" under a statute that declares certain
foreclosure sales to be void, there is no principled reason to declare that
the waiver doctrine is relevant under other statutes that use the null-
and-void language. There are many statutes in Mississippi that declare
a certain act, right, or thing null and void under certain circum-
stances. 66 Under Osborne, if any of these statutes arguably apply, there
64. Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1084-85 (Miss. 2009) ("Under the principle known as
'merger,' res judicata prevents the subsequent litigation of any claim that should have been litigated in a
previous action.").
65. See Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Williams, 357 So. 2d 934, 936 (Miss. 1978) (discussing mortgagor's
"right to elect between (1) having the sale set aside and (2) recovering from the mortgagee the damages
suffered as a result of the wrongful foreclosure").
66. See e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-7-42 (2011) (warrants by the State Fiscal Officer that are not
"presented to the State Treasurer for payment within one year. . . shall be null and void"); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-11 (2011) (contracts approved by Board of Supervisors in violation of open session and
low bid requirements "shall be void"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-13-13 (2011) (ordinances not listed in
municipality's ordinance book "shall be void and of no effect"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-41-59 (2011)
(sale of property for unpaid taxes "shall be void" if "made at the wrong time or at the wrong place");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-43-11 (2011) (failure to give notice of tax sale to "lienors shall render the tax
title void as to such lienors"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-3-3 (2011) (warrants for the removal of prisoners
from custody issued without authorization "shall be void"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-718 (2011) (a
commercial contract "fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty"); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 75-67-127 (2011) (small loans made in violation of statutory requirements "shall be void and the
[loan maker] shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, charges or recompense whatso-
ever"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-67-325 (2011) (pawn contracts with unlicensed pawn broker are "void");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-81-117 (2011) (contracts for dance studio lessons that do not comply with statu-
tory requirements "shall be void and unenforceable"); Miss. CODE Ar'm.§ 75-83-5 (2011) (health spa
contracts that do not comply with statutory requirements "shall be void and unenforceable"); Miss.
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can be no "final" judgment until the aggrieved party actually raises the
nullity argument.67
B. Section 89-1-55 May Be Construed in a Constitutional
Manner that Does Not Abridge the Judiciary's
Power to Declare an Argument Waived
Although the Osborne majority did not undertake a constitutional
analysis, its rule represents a plain break with the Mississippi Supreme
Court's separation of powers doctrine. As explained above, it seems an
uncontroversial proposition that determining whether (and when) to deem
an argument "waived" is a quintessential matter of judicial procedure.
Mississippi courts have exercised the discretion to establish, adjust, and ap-
ply common law waiver rules even before the current Mississippi Constitu-
tion was adopted." A court's discretion to deem an argument waived is
critical to the orderly and efficient disposition of cases and discourages par-
ties from pursuing piecemeal litigation.6 9 It is a "core power" of the
judiciary.
The legislature, therefore, may not enact a statute declaring that the
doctrine of waiver "shall not apply" in certain cases. This would be no
different than enacting a statute to the effect that summary judgment "shall
not be granted" in certain cases. Both (hypothetical) statutes would di-
rectly conflict with court procedural rules and both would be deemed un-
constitutional.70 But this is, in effect, how Osborne construed section 89-1-
55. In Osborne, the waiver doctrine was "irrelevant" (i.e., it did not apply)
because the statute declared Neblett's rights in the property to be null and
void as a matter of substantive law.7 ' Stated differently, Osborne read sec-
tion 89-1-55 to provide that the procedural waiver doctrine "shall not ap-
ply" to bar a claim that a foreclosure sale was null and void on the basis of
deficient publication. That claim survives indefinitely even though other
claims against the foreclosing party are pursued to a final judgment.
Osborne's reading of section 89-1-55 to implicitly abrogate the waiver
doctrine puts the statute in direct conflict with the judiciary's constitutional
CODE ANN. § 81-27-5.402 (2011) (any "act, deed, conveyance, pledge, or contract" of a state trust com-
pany is "void" if not in compliance with statutory or regulatory requirements); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 87-
1-1 (2011) (certain gaming and gambling contracts "shall be utterly void"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-29
(2011) (real property conveyances that violate state homestead law are "invalid"); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 91-9-1 (2011) (a trust that is not in writing and signed by the party making the trust "shall be utterly
void").
67. I recognize that this "parade of horribles" may never come to pass. Osborne's rule, however,
is stated in general terms and has no readily discernible limitations. There are no guarantees that
"ingenious lawyers charged with representing their client's cause" will not seek to stretch the rule to
new and unforeseen circumstances. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 187 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
68. See Yeizer v. Burke, 11 Miss. 439 (Miss. Err. & App. 1844) (refusing to consider on appeal
issue that was not raised before the trial court).
69. See Meadows v. Blake, 36 So. 3d 1225, 1233-34 (Miss. 2010) (Waller, C.J., concurring). Chief
Justice wailer's concurring opinion was joined by five justices. Id. at 1234.
70. See State v. Delaney, 52 So. 3d 348, 351 (Miss. 2011).
71. Osborne v. Neblett, 65 So. 3d 311, 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
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power to control court procedure. If this was the only permissible reading
of the statute, it should have been struck down as unconstitutional, not
given effect to revive arguments that Osborne had waived.72 The legisla-
ture does not have the power to declare the judiciary's waiver doctrine
"irrelevant" or inapplicable. The discretion to deem arguments waived and
cases closed is necessary to an efficiently-functioning judiciary. If section
89-1-55 implicitly abrogates the waiver doctrine, such an implicit abroga-
tion would be unconstitutional and, therefore, void.73
Osborne's reading of the statute, however, is not the only permissible
one. The plain language of section 89-1-55 does not abrogate the waiver
rule; it simply declares that a certain act is void as a matter of substantive
law. The legislature's declaration that a particular act or right is a nullity
under state substantive law should not be read as an implicit abrogation of
procedural doctrines, such as the waiver rule. Instead, this substantive en-
actment should be construed in harmony with standing procedural rules"
and "to conform to constitutional requirements"75 if at all possible.
Section 89-1-55 may be construed in harmony with the waiver doctrine
and, therefore, in conformity with the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine. Under a fair reading of the statute, the legislature has declared
deficiently-published foreclosure sales null and void, but has not made any
statement regarding whether or when this "nullity" argument may be
deemed waived. Under the statute, a party has a right to petition a court to
set aside such an invalid sale and a court is bound to do so. If, however, a
party petitions the court to set aside a foreclosure sale on other grounds,
and fails to raise the deficient publication argument, the court may deem
the party to have waived his nullity argument, like any other meritorious
claim or argument, even if it would have been a winning argument.
The possibility that a litigant may waive a substantive right or claim
conferred by statute is not a basis for construing the statute to preclude
application of the waiver doctrine. The waiver doctrine bars meritorious
claims and arguments, even those that would have carried the day if they
had been presented.7 6 The legislature is presumed to have understood this
application of the waiver doctrine when it enacted section 89-1-55.11 If the
legislature intended to abrogate the waiver doctrine (a procedural rule) for
72. See Delaney, 52 So. 3d at 351 ("[W]hen a statute conflicts with [the supreme court's] rules
regarding matters of judicial procedure, [the court's] rules control.").
73. See Stevens v. Lake, 615 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (1993).
74. When two statutes, or a statute and a procedural rule, appear to be in conflict, the two laws
"should if possible be construed in harmony with each other to give effect to each." Miss. Gaming
Comm'n v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Miss. 1999); see also Syngenta Crop
Prot., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 908 So. 2d 121, 127-28 (Miss. 2005).
75. Miss. State Tax Comm'n v. Brown, 193 So. 794, 796-97 (Miss. 1940); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Davis, 171 So. 550, 551 (Miss. 1937) ("There must be such an interpretation of, and administra-
tion under, the statute as will harmonize it with the constitutional principles of the procedural system of
which it is a part.").
76. See Meadows v. Blake, 36 So. 3d 1225, 1233-34 (Waller, C.J., concurring).
77. Arant v. Hubbard, 824 So. 2d 611, 615 (Miss. 2002) ("First, we presume that the legislature,
when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws."); Candate v. State, 18 So. 2d 441, 441-42 (Miss. 1944)
(presuming that legislature was familiar with prior decisions establishing court procedure).
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claims that a foreclosure sale was invalid, it likely would have done so ex-
pressly, not by implication.78
Under the fair reading of section 89-1-55, supra, the substantive bene-
fits flowing from the proper publication of a foreclosure sale are preserved,
but a legal claim to those benefits, like any other claim at common law or
under statute, may be waived if not adequately pled or pursued in a law-
suit. The statutory "nullity" argument is not elevated to some special,
never-to-be-waived status that other meritorious claims do not enjoy. The
statute serves its purpose and the well-established judicial procedures of
waiver and res judicata remain undisturbed.
V. CONCLUSION
The power to deem an argument waived, or a case finally adjudicated,
belongs to the judicial branch. If deprived of that core power, the courts
cannot dispose of litigation in an orderly and efficient manner and litigants
can take no comfort in the "finality" of their judgments. The legislature
may not abrogate the waiver doctrine and there is no indication in the lan-
guage of section 89-1-55 that it intended to do so. Osborne's contrary rule,
which threatens to disrupt court proceedings and undo established court
procedure, should be overturned when the opportunity is presented.
78. See Arant, 824 So. 2d at 615. Of course, if it had done so expressly, the statute would have
been unconstitutional.
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